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Abstract Archaeological predictive modeling has been used successfully for over
20 years as a decision-making tool in cultural resources management. Its
appreciation in academic circles however has been mixed because of its perceived
theoretical poverty. In this paper, we discuss the issue of integrating current
archaeological theoretical approaches and predictive modeling. We suggest a
methodology for doing so based on cognitive archaeology, middle range theory,
and paleoeconomic modeling. We also discuss the problems associated with testing
predictive models.
Keywords Predictivemodeling . Cognitivearchaeology . Middle range theory .Model
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Introduction
It has now been more than 20 years since one of the most influential books ever to
appear on spatial modeling in archaeology was published: Quantifying the Present
and Predicting the Past: Theory, Method and Application of Archaeological
Predictive Modelling (Judge and Sebastian 1988). This edited volume of papers
centered on the principles and techniques to be applied, and the difficulties
encountered, when trying to make a spatial prediction of the potential archaeological
record. The wide-ranging contributions in this one volume focused on trying to
make archaeological predictions from known observations and how to test them. The
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ideas outlined still influence the ways in which archaeologists deal with GIS and
spatial modeling. They have also, to a large degree, determined the ways in which
predictive modeling is currently applied in cultural resource management (CRM).
The volume mainly reflected existing practice in North American archaeology at the
time and as such was firmly rooted in the processual tradition. In those days, a quantitative
model was used sometimes almost as a goal in itself (see, e.g., Thomas 1978).
Furthermore, predictive modeling heavily relied on the ecosystemic approach advocated
in New Archaeology (most notably by Binford 1972, 1982). Since then, many
researchers working in archaeological applications of GIS and predictive modeling have
struggled to come to terms with the ensuing theoretical debate in archaeology between
the processual and post-processual schools of thought (see, e.g., Wheatley 1993, 2004;
Witcher 1999). Even though some have managed to include aspects of post-processual
thought in a quantitative (GIS) framework, many researchers working with GIS and
statistics have given up the fight altogether and keep on working in a processual
framework—without drawing overt attention to this in their own writings.
As an undesired consequence, the development of predictive modeling has veered
away from mainstream archaeological thought and theory and has now become a
largely self-contained activity—enjoying reasonable success as a tool for CRM, but
not commanding much respect from academic scholars. This has largely resulted
from the desire to use predictive models as tools for minimizing field effort rather
than for explaining the differential spatial patterning of archaeological sites.
Although the debate is far from conclusive regarding the benefits of predictive
modeling in the world of heritage management, it is clear that many current
applications in CRM are often simplistic and intended by non-archaeologist land
managers to be cost-saving rather than explanatory.
Over the past 10 years, a few practitioners of predictive modeling have been trying to
work on alternatives to current practice (see van Leusen and Kamermans 2005;
Kamermans et al. 2009). Up to now, their efforts have not led to a real breakthrough in
thinking about predictive modeling outside the small circle of scholars involved. In
this paper, we want to lay out the background to the issue, restate the case for
integration of archaeological theory and predictive modeling, and develop a
methodology for doing so. While there are obvious cost-saving benefits for even
simple predictive models in the area of selecting alternatives or even motivating land
managers to fund protective measures or place an emphasis on maximizing
interpretive results, we specifically want to focus on the process of theory-based
modeling rather than on the resulting models and the uses they are put to. We hope
that this will point the way out of a debate which we feel has been unduly polarized
along the lines of CRM versus academic research, as we are convinced that predictive
modeling can be a useful instrument for both fields of application.
A Short History of Predictive Modeling
The roots of predictive modeling can be largely traced back to the rise of processual
or New Archaeology in the late 1960s, even though archaeologists have always been
interested in issues of where sites are located and why. The pioneering work of
Willey (1953) in the Viru Valley, as the genesis of directed settlement studies, greatly
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influenced the development of later analyses and both the theory and methods
chosen to build predictive models. But the realization that the location of human
settlement is closely related to characteristics of the natural environment, coupled
with the processual emphasis on quantitative methods, was what enabled the
formulation of statistical models for the prediction of site density in areas where no
archaeological sites had yet been found.
While the term “predictive model” itself can be traced back to publications of the
early 1970s, it is only in the second half of that decade that predictive models started
to be produced on a larger scale in the USA. Interestingly, the general methodology
of predictive modeling was developed long before the first affordable GIS software
became available in the mid 1980s. Seminal research on issues of predicting site
location was carried out by the Southwest Anthropological Research Group in the
early 1970s (Plog and Hill 1971). It also seems that the first use of multivariate
statistics to predict site location was already applied by 1973 in the former British
Honduras (Green 1973).
By the 1980s, two primary lines of research were being called predictive models:
first, a largely theoretical series of models based on the use of ecosystemic structures and
relationships to identify spatial suitability (e.g., Jochim 1976, 1981; Bettinger 1980) but
which had no substantial quantitative evaluation of a spatial area (in the same sense as
we would expect in a GIS) and, second, a series of models that were based on
extrapolating the environmental variables from the landscape in a quantitative fashion
and building correlative statistical summaries that could be applied in unsurveyed
areas (e.g., Kvamme 1983, 1984, 1985; Parker 1985) yet which were by no means
easy to produce. The earliest models produced by Kvamme (1983, 1984), for example,
were constructed using an advanced pocket calculator that could be programmed to
perform the necessary calculations. It is therefore inaccurate to assume that GIS has
been the main factor influencing the initial development of predictive modeling,
although it certainly helped its further proliferation in the 1990s.
In later publications, the statistical extrapolation methods developed in the early
1980s are often referred to as “inductive” (Kamermans and Wansleeben 1999),
although the terms “correlative” (Sebastian and Judge 1988) and “data driven”
(Wheatley and Gillings 2002) are also used (Fig. 1). This form of modeling
compares known site data, usually within a controlled survey area, with
“environmental” datasets like distance to water, soil type, and slope, and then
extrapolates the correlations found to areas where no site information is available,
usually by means of logistic regression (see, e.g., Warren 1990). Archaeological
theory on site location preference only plays a very limited role in these models. The
variables analyzed and used for prediction are obviously thought to have some
relation to site location preference, but little or no attention is paid to ideas on how
people may have used and perceived the landscape in the past.
This way of modeling is contrasted to a “deductive”, “explanatory,” or “theory
driven” approach, in which archaeological site information is not used to look for
correlations but only for testing purposes (Fig. 2). These models are based on
hypotheses of settlement location preferences and are modeled using relatively
simple GIS techniques like weighted overlays. Dalla Bona (1994), for example, used
theories about the subsistence practices of Native American hunter-gatherers in
Ontario to model (among other things) potential moose habitats as attractive zones
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for site location. Initially, these explanatory models were mainly used in regions with
a relative absence of site information. Later they were also applied in areas where the
available site information could not be reliably related to survey activities (see, e.g.,
Deeben et al. 2002). In many cases, these models are relatively unsophisticated, to
the point of being called “intuitive” or “expert judgment” models. While these may
successfully be combined with statistical methods (Verhagen 2006; van Leusen et al.
2009), current practice still relies on either inductive or deductive modeling, not on
approaches where both are combined. We want to stress however that the dichotomy
between the “inductive” and “deductive” arose in the late 1970s as a historical
development and not necessarily as two methodological schools of thought, and as
such they should not be thought of as mutually exclusive frameworks.
At this point, it may be useful to clarify our own position regarding the definition
of predictive modeling in archaeology. A basic definition was already introduced by
Kohler and Parker (1986, p. 400):
Predictive modeling is a technique that, at a minimum, tries to predict “the
location of archaeological sites or materials in a region, based either on a
sample of that region or on fundamental notions concerning human behaviour”
Following this definition, we will only speak about predictive models if they



















Fig. 2 The procedure used for deductive predictive modeling. The model is created on the basis of
hypotheses on site location preferences. In many cases, these are no more than “educated guesses.” The
model can easily be tested with statistical methods as the archaeological data set is not used for building
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Fig. 1 The procedure used for inductive predictive modeling. A statistical comparison of archaeological
data and “environmental” variables is used to create a predictive model. This model is then tested either
through statistical methods using withheld or new data or by means of peer review (expert judgment).
After Kamermans and Wansleeben (1999)
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remains outside the zones where they have already been discovered in the past
(Verhagen 2007a, p. 14). This is regardless of whether the model is used for CRM
purposes or serves as a testable hypothesis for further scientific research. Prediction
is an essential outcome; “models” without predictions are better categorized under
the header of site location analysis. But since we are confronted, in the process of
setting up the models, with numerous theoretical, technical, and methodological
issues of spatial analysis in archaeology, it may not come as a surprise that Altschul
et al. (2004) stated that many archaeologists now believe that spatial analysis (or
“using GIS”) equates to predictive modeling.
The principle of statistical extrapolation, particularly as it was used in correlative
models, proved to be useful for CRM purposes in the USA. After the introduction of
the National Historic Preservation Act in 1966, federal agencies, confronted with the
question on how to deal with their responsibility to “identify historic properties on
their lands (...) and to record such properties when they must be destroyed” (King
1984, p. 116), generated a demand for what was initially called “predictive survey”
to limit the costs associated with identifying and managing such resources. Federal
agencies with these management responsibilities were able to fund such studies and
helped initiate their proliferation. But while the CRM industry provided the
monetary backing for predictive models and the goals expected in a CRM context
were driving the format of their development and application, the theoretical debate
and the discussion regarding acceptance or rejection of predictive models as a whole
was still being framed within the scientific community.
This is perhaps best seen in the influence of landmark syntheses and theoretical
articles that look at spatial decision-making. Aside from the hunter–gatherer studies
of Jochim (1976, 1981) and Bettinger (1980) already alluded to, an excellent
example is the work of Limp and Carr (1985), which initiates decision-making as an
interpretive topic in archaeology and provides a forerunner for both agent-based and
GIS modeling. Kohler and Parker (1986) laid the groundwork for a definitive look at
the practice of predictive modeling itself, while Judge and Sebastian (1988) followed
it up and fleshed it out. Other landmark studies that definitively affected the course
of predictive and other forms of GIS modeling include Allen et al. (1990—
particularly the individual chapters by Warren, Altschul, and Savage), Renfrew and
Zubrow (1994), Harris and Lock (1995), Lock and Stančič (1995), Aldenderfer and
Maschner (1996), and Wescott and Brandon (2000).
The use of predictive models in CRM has engendered both enthusiasm and
criticism. In the USA, Canada, The Netherlands, and to a lesser extent in Germany,
the Czech Republic, and Australia, predictive models are routinely used to obtain an
assessment of site density in an area that might either be facing a direct threat of
disturbance or in a planning zone where policies on CRM need to be determined. In
other countries, predictive models are at best seen as interesting sources of
information when preparing for survey, but in some cases predictive modeling is
outrightly rejected as a tool for CRM. Resistance has been particularly strong in the
UK and France. The argument is often voiced that the models are by definition
unable to predict the location of all archaeological sites (see also Altschul et al.
2004). Especially in areas that are predicted to be of “low archaeological potential,”
predictive models are in practice used to recommend a less intensive survey strategy,
and in this way sites may be overlooked and lost forever.
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While it is illusory to think that we will be able to detect all archaeological
remains in an area without stripping it completely, the practice of targeting areas for
survey on the basis of predictive models is still regarded by some as almost
sacrilegious (see, e.g., Wheatley 2004). However, practice shows that when
predictive models are not used, there will be less opportunity for archaeologists to
influence spatial planning in the early stages. A predictive map can be a very
powerful and useful instrument for the protection of the archaeological heritage—
when used wisely. An alternative analysis approach can, for example, be employed
for certain types of CRM projects. It has been shown to lead to significant financial
savings yet is not as controversial because it does not recommend differential survey
strategies. In this application, a predictive model is still used to determine which
areas are more likely to produce archaeological sites and which are less likely to do
so, but the field effort is not changed between high- and low-potential zones. Instead,
the same level of effort is employed throughout, but where there are several different
options the planners are forewarned about the specific costs which are likely to be
entailed with each alternative. Therefore, they can choose the one which will
probably be less costly in terms of archaeological survey and later testing and
mitigation costs can be anticipated. This approach is commonly used for large-scale
highway planning purposes, and especially in the case of well-established and well-
defined models (such as the Minnesota Model; Hudak et al. 2002) it has been used
with financial success and is supported by the review agencies involved.
The conflict between the theoretical goals of scientific research and the practical
matters of budget management by the efficient targeting of survey resources is
almost pre-ordained by the focus of both research and CRM on the archaeological
“site” as the base unit of analysis. The site is seen as the most significant locale for
both research and protection because of its accumulation of material debris. A site’s
level of protection, however, is typically based on its potential for future research
(whether it was located with a predictive model or not). A predictive model which
recommends a less intensive survey strategy for some areas is then merely
classifying some sites as being of lesser importance than others (i.e., those that are
predicted by the model are presumed more important for preservation and hence
future research). But this is little different from the classification strategy used by all
archaeologists when they choose to ignore certain kinds of site (such as non-
diagnostic lithic scatters) or even “non-site” locations in general. It is also the
strategy used when they develop intuitive models for targeting research survey
projects.
The entire notion of a “site” presupposes that there are parts of the landscape that
are less important for research or preservation at all—presumably those areas with
no accumulation of artifactual debris. But is it correct to assume that prehistoric
people would have classified their landscape the same way? Is it not logical to
assume that vast areas of the landscape were important to prehistoric people for the
resources they provided (among other things)? Yet these areas could never be
classified as archaeological sites or undergo protection from development or
eradication merely because no artifacts accumulated, the material remains were all
perishable, or these are otherwise not detectable today. If we focused on
understanding how people inhabit and use their environment from a cognitive
perspective and not by where they accumulate their detritus, then the “site” becomes
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merely an area where a certain kind of behavior led to the accumulation of debris or
features—not the entirety of research potential. This becomes particularly important
as predictive modeling matures theoretically.
Predictive Modeling as a Scientific Endeavor
Understandably, given the traditional theoretical training of today’s archaeologists
and the powerful funding mechanisms of CRM, the focus of research in predictive
modeling has been on its utility for cost savings and the improvement of existing
techniques and data sets rather than pushing the envelope, so to speak, of theoretical
research. This does not imply an absence of innovation however, especially in the
realm of statistical analyses. The suite of applicable statistical techniques has,
amongst others, been extended to Bayesian statistics (Millard 2005; Finke et al.
2008; van Leusen et al. 2009), Dempster–Shafer modeling (Ejstrud 2003, 2005; van
Leusen et al. 2009), and resampling (Verhagen 2007b). The importance of bias
identification and reduction in both environmental and archaeological data sets has
long been recognized (Ducke and Münch 2005; Verhagen 2007b), as well as the
relevance of using geo-archaeological data for the reconstruction of past landscapes
(e.g., Zeidler 2001; Peeters 2007). However, relatively little attention has gone to the
positioning of predictive modeling within a scientific research framework (but see
Whitley 2004, 2005).
An extreme position in this might be taken by some practitioners of CRM who
feel that the work done in CRM is emphatically not science, although survey and
excavation should be done according to scientifically proven and approved methods.
In this way of thinking, it does not really matter what kind of methods we apply as
long as we can be certain that they produce a sufficiently reliable result. At the other
end of the spectrum, we find academic researchers who feel that science (in its
meaning of “hard”, quantifiable science) is alien to the core business of archaeology:
the interpretation and explanation of past societies. From this point of view,
traditional (either inductive or deductive) predictive modeling provides an easy
target for criticism as it provides no or insufficient understanding of how and, most
importantly, why settlement patterns have come about.
Dobres and Robb (2005) describe the “normal” archaeological research process as
starting with the formulation of theory, which then leads to the choice for a
method(ology) to collect data. In this scheme, models are potential end products of
research together with explanation and interpretation. While they object to this linear
approach and advocate what they call an interdigitating research practice, it is clear
that they consider this to be the standard way for archaeologists to do research. It
also explains why the predictive models are regarded with so much suspicion. If we
expect models to be on equal footing with interpretative and explanatory accounts,
then we will be almost inevitably disappointed in them, and using them as starting
points (like we do with predictive models), rather than end products, seems
inherently incorrect.
Modeling (of any type) can be better considered within a slightly different
generalized scheme of scientific research (Fig. 3, somewhat adapted after O’Sullivan
and Gahegan 2007) that starts with the collection of data (acknowledging of course
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that data are never collected without a research question in mind). The first activity
is then a phase of exploratory data analysis: what are the features of the data set that
could possibly answer our research questions? In this phase, several exploratory
statistical techniques can be useful to detect patterns and perform classifications. On
the basis of the patterns that suggest themselves in this exploratory phase, a second
step is then the establishment of a “true” theory, i.e., one that transparently specifies
the (quantitative) relationships between the variables that are thought to be
responsible for the patterns detected. Inductive statistical models can then be used
to generalize this theory to unknown instances, but generalizations obviously can be
made on the basis of logical arguments as well—and this is what we usually
understand by deductive modeling. The results of these generalizations should then
be open to scrutiny; a testing phase is needed in which new data are collected to see
whether the theory holds in the light of new evidence. If this proves to be successful,
then theory, model, and evidence combined can be published and represented with
maps and graphs; this is the basis for rhetoric, the core of scientific debate and
publication. In this scheme, modeling is only a tool for the generalization of
theoretical concepts. In this way, it also constitutes a method for opening up a theory
to testing and as such does not preclude backtracking to the original theory and data
when the model fails to deliver.
It will be clear that the exploratory (theory building) and testing phases in this
scheme are the most problematic for predictive modeling. In many instances, the
data used for predictive modeling were never collected with the explicit aim of
constructing a predictive model from it, creating all kinds of bias that are undesired

























Fig. 3 The position of modeling in the scientific research process. Quantitative methods and models can
play a role in almost any stage of scientific research but are best applied in the stages where theory is
developed and made suitable for testing. The separation between hypothesis and theory however may not
always be as clear as suggested. Adapted after O’Sullivan and Gahegan (2007)
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notorious in this respect, but the same holds true for many of the environmental
“variables” that are customarily used for predictive modeling, like digital elevation
models and soil maps. First of all, the accuracy and amount of detail of these can
vary greatly; digital elevation models are especially notorious in this respect, and any
errors in the original elevation maps will also have repercussions on the accuracy of
derived data like slope maps, cost surfaces, and viewsheds (see, e.g., Nackaerts et al.
1999). Furthermore, the classification schemes used for soil maps are intended for
modern agricultural land suitability valuation purposes. While the modern view of
land suitability may bear some relation to the (pre-)historic perception of land
quality, this is by no means a straightforward relationship (see, e.g., Favory and van
der Leeuw 1998, pp. 278–284). Thirdly, landscapes are dynamic systems that are
subject to constant change. Cartographic representations of the current elevation, soil
type, and other variables will therefore not necessarily reflect the situation in the past
(see, e.g., Zeidler 2001).
Furthermore, the theory building that should go on between the phases of data
exploration and extrapolation is currently often neglected. Theory, when it is
considered at all, is either assumed to be existing and only needing extrapolation or
it is reduced to specifying rather simplistic (ecological) cause–effect relationships
that can be fit to the available environmental data sets. For example, the assumption
that prehistoric farmers would have preferred fertile land for agriculture is hardly
contentious. However, when asked where this land might have been, how much of it
would have been necessary to support the population, and where settlements might
have been located with regard to the accessibility of this land or any other resources,
theory readily gives way to the basic practical notion that certain soil types are more
productive than others and therefore the corresponding units depicted on the soil
map will have supported more settlements. This assumption is made without regard
to whether the prehistoric farmers had the ability to measure and track slight
differences in soil fertility across the landscape and place settlements accordingly.
However, translating theory into a (predictive) quantitative model is not always
easy. Tschauner (1996) states that most archaeological theory building can be
characterized by generalizations in two forms: “general laws” and “statistical laws.”
The first type of law can be recognized in statements such as “ritual is ‘important’ to
leadership, and institutionalized ritual is an ‘effective means’ of protecting and
legitimating power” (Tschauner 1996, p. 11). These are qualifying statements that
are usually arrived at through logical deduction. The second type of law usually can
be recognized by reference to frequencies and numbers, for example, when it is said
that ceremonial rituals are “frequently associated” with the establishment and
reiteration of relationships between people, objects and images. These “statistical
laws” however should not be confused with true statistical statements about
frequencies and associations as they might easily be based on general impressions
rather than robust statistical analyses.
Note that neither “general” nor “statistical” laws necessarily imply the
specification of causal and/or quantitative relationships. Hence, no probabilities
can be attached to these theories other than the ones suggested by the archaeological
data set themselves. And while predictive models based on such theories may then
seem to produce reasonable results from a CRM perspective (like predicting 70% of
the archaeological site sample “correctly” or rather placing them in a zone of high
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archaeological potential), there is no mechanism available to test the theoretical
assumptions of the model. The absence of causality in such statements would draw
considerable criticism from philosophers of science (e.g., Salmon 1971, 1998).
So, while predictive modeling is from a scientific point of view a perfectly
laudable and worthwhile enterprise that can be used to extend theories of spatial
patterning into testable generalizations, in practice it stumbles when dealing with
developing and testing site location theories in archaeology. The absence of well-
developed causal explanations tends to relegate archaeological predictive modeling
to either a vague intuitive impression of “high sensitivity” areas or a series of “so
what?” correlative statements. But how do other disciplines then deal with this?
Predictive Modeling Outside Archaeology
In fact, other disciplines do not fare much better, although some of these might seem
to be better equipped with tested and testable theories. We can make a basic
distinction between disciplines that try to predict on the basis of mechanistic and/or
biological processes, like geology and ecology, and those that are dealing with issues
of human decision-making, like economics and politics. Archaeology in that sense
takes an intermediate position as it combines elements of both.
Geology is a prime example of a discipline where human decision-making issues
are completely absent. Predictive modeling is mainly used as a tool for mineral
exploration purposes. The available literature is relatively limited and is mainly
concerned with the use of weight-of-evidence techniques (a spin-off of Bayesian
statistics; Bonham-Carter 1994; Raines 1999) for predicting mineral occurrences at
the earth’s surface. More recent papers also discuss the use of fuzzy logic and
logistic regression in these models. Geological research in general however tends to
focus more on developing complex 3D-models for mineral resources prediction at
large depths. For these applications, current 3D GIS is not the best tool available due
largely to the problems of dealing with volumetric data in three-dimensional space.
The weight-of-evidence models are data-driven, and concerns about the effects of
exploration bias on the modeling results can be found in some publications (e.g.,
Coolbaugh et al. 2007).
Quite remarkably, theoretical concerns about the formation processes of mineral
ores seem to be completely absent: the motivation for choosing the independent
variables that predict ore occurrence is flimsy to say the least. It is therefore hard to
judge whether this reflects a true lack of understanding of the processes that
influence mineral distribution or whether these variables are considered to be almost
self-evident predictors. Oreskes (1998) however clearly indicates that the geo-
sciences experience similar problems with regard to model building and testing as
the social sciences in the absence of sufficiently accessible and measurable data. She
even states that “geological, biological and ecological models have no historic track
record of predictive success at all” (Oreskes 2003, p. 24).
Ecology may in fact be the discipline where the closest parallels to archaeological
predictive modeling are found. Ecologists depend on fragmented and uncertain
information on the spatial occurrence and abundance of animal and plant species,
and the factors determining species distribution in different ecosystems are only
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partly understood. Predictive modeling in ecology is also closely connected to
management issues related to wildlife conservation and protection programs and is
therefore strongly driven by a need for accurate predictions.
Since ecologists are dealing with the physiological responses of animal and plant
species to environmental conditions, one might expect them to be in a better position
to use quantitative deductive modeling procedures than archaeologists are.
Nevertheless, much of the theory underpinning ecological predictive models seems
to be highly generalized, and still inductive modeling using linear or logistic
regression methods prevails (for some examples, see Hoving et al. 2004; Mathys et
al. 2006; Zimmermann and Breitenmoser 2007; Hengl et al. 2009). In recent years,
random forest models—a machine learning technique—have become more popular
(e.g., Cutler et al. 2007; Peters et al. 2007). Huston (2002) states that the theory of
community ecology (which he sees as the body of ecological theory most relevant to
species occurrence modeling) “lacks a rigorously tested and widely accepted
theoretical framework.” As it is at the same time described as a “broad subdiscipline
spanning population and ecosystem ecology and including a range of processes
operating from the molecular to the continental,” this is perhaps not very surprising.
Ecology is also dealing with highly dynamic processes in which species compete for
space and in which seasonal rhythms play an important role. These processes are
usually approached through some form of quantitative deductive modeling, without
much empirical data to support the theoretical assumptions used. Agent-based
modeling, while frequently used for simulating and understanding ecological and
evolutionary processes, is not applied extensively for predictive purposes.
Most reported studies suggest that reasonable or even high success rates are
achieved in predicting the habitats of the species considered. The figures cited
however are not usually in excess of the predictive success of many archaeological
predictive models.
Ironically, predictive modeling is also widely used in another form of CRM—
customer relationship management (e.g., Rygielski et al. 2002; Verhoef 2003). It is a
form of marketing (or market analysis) which helps companies target consumers
based on predictions derived typically from personal data, demographics, and past
purchases. Such economics-based predictive models (also called predictive analytics
in this field) analyze the likelihood of both sales and customer retention. One
example is healthcare insurance providers who employ predictive modeling methods
to proactively avoid catastrophic costs associated with high-risk group members and
health crises. This may include projections based on genetic correlates with deadly
(or costly) diseases. Models of this kind are rarely theoretically described, only
occasionally have spatial characteristics, and are based on many of the same
principles and assumptions defined above. They include sophisticated methods and
even have a dedicated software (e.g., DTREG: http://www.dtreg.com). One
peculiarity not generally employed in archaeology includes “uplift modeling,”
which is a type of analysis based on the change in probability resulting from a
recorded action. Such models are sequential or iterative, and causality is expressed
much more explicitly than a vaguely correlative statement like: “a diet rich in fiber
may help reduce the risks of some kinds of cancer.” Uplift models are typically
utilized in analyzing rates of customer retention after changes in product design,
consumer economic conditions, or offered services. In general, intuitive or
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correlative predictive models are widespread in the healthcare, actuarial, and
economics disciplines and are fairly well accepted without much detailed discussion
on the validity of their statistical or theoretical assumptions.
So, despite the wide variety of disciplines that apply predictive modeling for
many kinds of analysis (of which we have not attempted to provide a comprehensive
overview), it seems that the theoretical underpinning of predictive models is equally
challenging whether we are dealing with mechanistic and/or biologic processes or
with human decision-making. What makes archaeological predictive modeling
perhaps even more demanding is the fact that it is a discipline in which both lines of
inquiry can play a role. Archaeological predictive modelers would therefore do well
to keep an eye open for alternate methods applied in other sciences.
The Role of Post-processual Theory
The post-processual school, initially developed in the early 1980s in response to the
seemingly anti-humanistic, ecosystemic, and deductive–nomological philosophy
promoted by the New Archaeology, has dominated much of the archaeological
theoretical discourse over the past 25 years, especially in the UK. Even though the
heated debate between the two schools now seems to have become somewhat
outdated (see, e.g., Hegmon 2003; Johnson 2006) and not many archaeologists
nowadays would profess to be adherents of the “hard-core” variants of either the
processual or post-processual paradigm, the effects of this debate (both good and
bad) are still felt.
Three important characteristics of post-processual archaeology are worth
emphasizing from the perspective of predictive modeling. Firstly, post-processual
theory usually strongly downplays the determining influence on human behavior of
both the natural environment and cultural “systems” of social organization. Instead,
the role of individuals (“agents”) is considered to be the driving force of all
archaeological patterning and as such should be the prime focus of archaeological
research and interpretation. This aspect of post-processual thinking is taken aboard
by many archaeologists nowadays, even though not all would see it as their principal
research goal. Especially North American prehistoric archaeologists are still
reluctant to see agency as a useful concept for their research. Furthermore, post-
processualism emphasizes the importance of individual experience. This has led
some archaeologists to fully embrace phenomenology and try to engage the mindset
of prehistoric people by simulating an immersion in their environment, by installing
doorframes in the landscape, for example, in order to understand what it would be
like to look at the landscape from inside a dwelling (see, e.g., Tilley et al. 2000).
These approaches are much more controversial and do not seem directly relevant to
predictive modeling, although they do suggest that archaeologists are beginning to
understand the need to recreate past cognitive processes.
Secondly, post-modern philosophy maintains that all scientific knowledge is a
social construct. Archaeological knowledge is continually reconstructed by archae-
ologists and therefore fluid, relative, and subjective (Shanks and Tilley 1987). This
means that the creation of multiple interpretations of the past is an integral and
indispensable aspect of doing archaeology. However, it is also taken to mean by
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some that looking for objectivity and scientific verification is pointless (Hodder
1991; see also Fleming 2006 for a critique), which seems paradoxical as these ways
of constructing knowledge should then be at least on a par with other interpretations.
This is probably the aspect of post-processual philosophy that has inspired the most
criticism as it is easy to show that this anti-scientific position mistakes using
scientific methods for scientism and positivism—which was indeed a characteristic
of the New Archaeology (Bell 1994). The not-so-hidden agenda of early, radical
post-processualism was therefore not to promote multiple interpretations in which
“objectivist” and “distanced” views can play a role next to more “engaged” ways of
looking at the past but an outright rejection of the empiricist and “scientistic” views.
A third conspicuous characteristic of post-processual archaeology, directly
following from this anti-scientific stance, is the importance it attributes to narrative
in archaeological interpretation. Tilley (2004, p. 225) even went so far as to describe
phenomenological writing as “a metaphorical work of ‘art’ for which we make no
apology.” Obviously, this means that maps, graphs, and tables are to be avoided in
these writings as these are thought to be attempts at objective, “cartesian”
descriptions—even though anyone who has ever tried to make maps knows that
these constitute specific interpretations. And, in fact, quantitative models are
representations as well and have even been described as “a work of fiction”
(Cartwright 1983, p. 153). In this sense, all archaeological interpretations are “works
of art” whether they contain specific graphical representations or not and whether
they evolve from processual or post-processual theorists. However, some might
amend that argument by stating that the “art” is in convincing your colleagues that
your interpretations are closer to the original thought and meaning of the people in
the past than other interpretations. The scientific method is merely the process by
which support can be generated amongst your colleagues and maintained for your
specific interpretations. The post-processual perspective would seem to reject the
notion that anyone other than the interpreter needs convincing and that all
interpretations are inherently equally valid, with or without collegial support.
Post-processualism has not been without its critics; yet, it has certainly led to a
decrease in the overall interest in quantitative approaches to archaeological
questions, and those interested in the contribution that “hard” science may have to
offer to archaeology have often found it difficult to wage a successful defense (see,
e.g., Pollard 2004). So, the research framework that was sketched above, in which
statistical methods and quantitative modeling form an integral part of “doing
science,” is not the way in which many archaeologists nowadays would see their
discipline. Instead, scientific methods and results are usually seen as auxiliary to
archaeological interpretation, like providing better chronological resolution in the
case of 14C-dating or aiding survey in the case of geophysical measurements. GIS is
routinely applied as a tool for “science” in archaeology, but it is almost always used
in either a straightforward data mapping overlay (often for data mining) or as a
method to achieve a low-level analysis, such as artifact densities, simple pattern
recognition, or regional settlement summaries. Quantitative models are not
necessarily regarded as useful heuristic tools to develop, improve, and test an
archaeological theory.
This is not to say that no one has tried to look at it that way. In fact, one of the
reasons why GIS attracted much interest in the late 1990s was that, in spite of its
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“processual” roots, it promised to be a tool for producing a form of quantitative
phenomenology through the use of cost-distances and viewshed calculations (see,
e.g., Witcher 1999; Llobera 1996, 2000, 2001, 2003). It has also been used to create
spatial models of land use from an agency perspective (e.g., Robb and van Hove
2003; Trifković 2005) through the concept of taskscape (Ingold 1993, 2000).
Most attempts to combine processual and post-processual thought in modeling
however cannot be considered very successful. Cognitive archaeology, for example,
was mounted by Renfrew and Zubrow (1994) to counter the early post-processual
critique on New Archaeology by explicitly including social (cognitive) aspects into a
systemic view of human behavior. However, it was not embraced by many and
seems to have faded into oblivion. The basic precepts of cognitive archaeology
though were once again indicative of the understanding that we may never grasp the
entirety of what people in the past thought or why they made certain decisions but,
through the process of logical deduction, we could build models for recreating some
aspects of their cognitive landscape or culture. The processualists opposed this with
the apocryphal statement that the only time an archaeologist enters the mind of their
subject is when the trowel slips while excavating a burial. The post-processualists
also opposed the same notion by rejecting the need for logical deduction—there was
no need to convince, thus no need for logic. Unfortunately, cognitive archaeology
arose at a time in which the two extremes of archaeological theory were at their most
divisive, and no real conciliation between them was sought or expected by either
side.
Complexity theory has been suggested as a way out as well (van der Leeuw and
McGlade 1997; Bentley and Maschner 2003). Recent developments in agent-based
and non-linear modeling show that this branch of theory is far from dead (Kohler
and Gumerman 2000; Beekman and Baden 2005; Kohler et al. 2007; Dean et al.
2006; Axtell et al. 2006; and Gumerman et al. 2006). In fact, it incorporates two
important characteristics of post-processual thought in a quantitative, dynamical
modeling framework by explicitly including the role of agents in creating (spatial)
patterns and by allowing for multiple model outcomes and thus multiple
interpretations. Modeling in this framework is primarily used as a heuristic tool. It
is however not usually seen in a post-processual light (but see Hegmon 2003) and
has failed to make a breakthrough into mainstream archaeology up to now not only
partly because of the technical difficulties involved but also because of the simplicity
of the rules employed. Critics of complexity theory assume that complex human
agents cannot be modeled with relatively simple parameters and decision–rules.
We can distinguish two varieties of agent-based models: those which incorporate
agency as a theoretical concept in how the model operates and where individual or
group decision-making is integral to its explanatory power (e.g., Wilkinson et al.
2007; Cleuziou 2007) and those which employ programmed cellular automata to run
through an iterative process on a spatial manifold according to general rules of
behavior, typically in a simulated environment (e.g., Epstein 2006) but sometimes in
a GIS (cf. Gimblett 2002). These can be seen as “passive” or “active” agent-based
models, respectively.
If we want to theorize about the cognitive landscape or the variations in how past
people made decisions, agency should be incorporated in a predictive model at least
on the theoretical level. However, if we can simulate the cognitive elements involved
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in spatial decision-making, then cellular automata can be programmed to evaluate
the relevant criteria according to behavioral rules. This is exactly the approach taken
by researchers in the American Southwest (e.g., Kohler et al. 2007; Dean et al. 2006;
Axtell et al. 2006; Gumerman et al. 2006) and is the basis for the models of
Mesopotamian urbanization used by Wilkinson et al. (2007).
Because agent-based modeling is interested in examining the spatial basis of
decision-making, it should be used to predict both intentional and unintentional
actions and the ways in which those actions come about. An agent-based model
needs to rely not only on intentional actions (programmed rules for cellular
automata) that fit with the spatial conditions at the time (the cell values at each
iteration of the model), but they must also illustrate each component of the process,
realistically resolve conflicting information, and generate outcomes from the limited
and conditional knowledge that an agent would have had.
This implies that an explanation of spatial behavior should incorporate a
“perspective” or a representation of the perception held by the agent. An
understanding of the causal processes entailed by the model does not come from a
global view but one conditioned by the costs and benefits of an action, along with
the knowledge, confidence, and risks involved in taking that action. This is perhaps
more complex than cellular automata can currently be programmed for in a simple
spatial manifold, but it is not out of the realm of the potential, particularly when
applied to real landscapes in a GIS.
From the foregoing, we conclude that the main problem with (hard-core) post-
processualism with regard to modeling is found in its rejection of scientific methods,
in the mistaken assumption that using these will automatically lead to “scientism” or
“positivism”. We embrace the post-processual emphasis on pluralism, as the only
way in which archaeology as a science can move forward is by looking at problems
from different angles (see also Wylie 2002, pp. 171–178). Apart from that, assessing
uncertainty and indeterminacy is an essential aspect of dealing with questions of
prediction. However, this does not imply that we endorse the anarchic and
relativistic “anything goes” perspective that is sometimes evident in post-
processual writing. We consider pluralism in the refutationist tradition of setting
up multiple models and theories that can be tested and compared in order to reveal
weaknesses and thus contribute to the advancement of theory (Bell 1994). In this
context, the advancement of theory implies that all interpretations are not inherently
equally valid and that, just as we evaluate some sites as more important (to us as
archaeologists) than others, the same applies to archaeological explanations and
interpretations. Scientific methods are essential to this. From this perspective,
quantitative modeling should be taken as seriously as collecting data, developing
logical arguments, and producing narratives. From the perspective of predictive
modeling, it means that theory building should be an integral part of the effort to
predict the location of archaeological resources.
Middle Range Theory
The question then remains: what kind of theory can lead to better predictions,
satisfying current theoretical concerns without becoming too complex to handle in
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practice? From a modeling perspective, middle range theory is an obvious candidate.
Middle range theory was first developed in sociology in the 1950s (see Merton
1968; Raab and Goodyear 1984; although Kosso 1991 claims that the natural
sciences were the main source of inspiration for it in archaeology). Merton (1968,
p. 52, as cited in Raab and Goodyear 1984) stated the problem with theory like this:
“A large part of what is now described as (...) theory consists of general
orientations toward data, suggesting types of variables which theories must
somehow take into account, rather than clearly formulated, verifiable state-
ments of relationships between specified variables.”
Crucially, the way in which Merton envisaged middle range theory is by the
creation of a logical structure in which working hypotheses can be confirmed or
negated and in this way reflect upon the validity of general theory. Middle range
theory is then the critical bridge between general theory and empirical data, in which
both inductive and deductive perspectives can be effective. Kosso (2006) provides a
simple example of how middle range theory is applied in archaeology. Archae-
ologists interpret off-site scatters of pot sherds as the product of manuring and
therefore as evidence for cultivation. The presence of pot sherds that are relatively
evenly spread over the area (the empirical data) leads to a logical, deductive, middle-
range explanation: the observed pattern can only have come about because people
mixed pot sherds with manure and spread this mixture over the land as fertilizer.
This implies that the area was under cultivation in a particular period of time, and
this can be used as evidence for further claims on the socio-economic situation.
Middle range theory as applied in archaeology was originally methodologically
oriented and primarily dealt with site formation processes and the so-called
behavioral archaeology (Schiffer 1976; Binford 1977, 1981, pp. 21–30). The focus
was upon typically natural processes that could be observed as having a measureable
influence upon material remains. Nevertheless, many archaeologists have identified
it as an indispensable tool for other types of archaeological research as well (see,
e.g., Bogaard 2004; Dobres and Robb 2005). In fact, even post-processualists have
routinely relied on it for developing their interpretations of the past (Kosso 1991;
Tschauner 1996), and Bell (1994, p. 18) asserts that virtually all archaeological
researches are about developing and applying middle range theory. According to
Binford (1981, pp. 21–30), good middle range theory should be unambiguous, based
on cause and effect rather than simple correlation, applicable to the past by using
uniformitarian assumptions, and intellectually independent of general theory. These
criteria are however not unproblematic, and we will try to illustrate this in the next
section.
Raab and Goodyear (1984) pointed out that most archaeological theories
developed by New Archaeologists aimed at both generality and comprehensiveness.
In other words, theory was on the one hand supposed to specify law-like
assumptions with universal applicability (“covering laws”) and at the same time
predict phenomena in considerable detail. The tension between these goals is
evident, and when applied in this way it is virtually impossible to connect
fundamental theory to actual data. As explained earlier, radical post-processualism
takes the other extreme and to a large extent denies the possibility (and therefore the
value) of generalization and prediction. Raab and Goodyear instead proposed to
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develop theory that is directed to explaining aspects of cultural systems that can be
explored empirically and that might, at some point, be connected to a higher-level
theory. Having written their paper just before the rise of post-processual archaeology,
they recommended a form of systems theory that also includes social aspects. As
mentioned earlier, examples of this way of thinking such as cognitive archaeology
and complexity theory have not met with general acceptance among archaeologists.
Afterthought
Having tried to recapitulate the major currents in archaeological thinking connected
to quantitative modeling over the past four decades, we cannot help but look in
wonder at the theoretical labyrinth that seems to have been erected. As discussed
earlier, other sciences seem to be somewhat less concerned with the theoretical
justification of quantitative model building and in that sense may be considered too
naïve in their approaches to predictive modeling. On the other hand, the almost
impenetrable jungle of archaeological theoretical writing has not helped us very
much towards a better integration of quantitative modeling in archaeological
research. Theoretical notions are often defined in such an abstract way that it may
be quite hard to figure out whether we are dealing with, for example, middle range
theory at all.
Between Merton’s definition and the interpretations of Raab and Goodyear,
Binford, Kosso, and Tschauner, a substantial gray area is found in which these
writers are struggling to position middle range theory in archaeological research
practice. The same can be said for much post-processual writing. Dobres and Robb
(2000), for example, reflect on the lack of a clear definition of agency in archaeology
(even citing 12 definitions of it found in literature) in their introduction to 16 more
papers on the subject that only seem to agree on the fact that agency should be
included in archaeological research in some way.1 They even admit (Dobres and
Robb 2005) that “few ideas so popular in 21st century archaeology have led to such
sparse methodological developments.” Archaeologists appear to actively employ
popular terms such as “agency” without specifying or perhaps even understanding
their definitions.
In our attempt to give theory a more prominent place in predictive modeling, we
will therefore not aim to solve it all and provide a universal method for dealing with
it or to give all interpretations of theoretical schools their due place in it. We are
however convinced that there are practical ways to better embed archaeological
theory in predictive modeling. In elaborating this, we will mainly stick to the
concept of middle range theory as defined by Binford (1981) and Raab and
Goodyear (1984), including aspects of agency theory and cognitive archaeology, and
acknowledging that multiple models may be necessary to arrive at sound predictions.
1 The clarification of the subject is not helped by definitions like ‘Agency is always situated in the
resources of space/time, a being-in-the-world whose actions carry the past into the future and which make
reference to absent places in the locations of its own operations’ (Barrett 2000). It is just one example of a
tendency to mystify aspects of archaeological theory in terms that are almost as incomprehensible to the
uninitiated as mathematical equations.
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Elucidating Middle Range Theory: Urnfields and Settlement in the Southern
Netherlands
As an example, we can take the distribution of Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age
settlement in the southern Netherlands (approx. 1100–500 BC). This particular
example is taken because it constitutes an issue of considerable debate in Dutch
archaeology, and this debate has clear implications for predictive modeling in the
area. For the moment, however, a predictive model based on the various theoretical
approaches suggested is still lacking, and the example is only used here to illustrate
the complexities of translating various theoretical approaches into middle range
theory that could be used for predictive modeling purposes.
Several important cultural changes are observed at the transition of Middle to Late
Bronze Age in the area, and these are summarized as follows (Roymans and
Kortlang 1999, p. 36):
1. A new mortuary ritual is introduced in the form of urnfields. These are collective
cemeteries of small barrows at stable locations, whereas earlier burial mounds
were more widely spaced and probably only used by individual family units.
2. New, decorated ceramics are introduced that are particularly abundant in grave
contexts.
3. Bronze objects become more common, including prestigious weaponry. This is
attributed to a more intensive circulation of these goods through Atlantic and
Central European exchange networks.
4. A new system of arable farming is introduced in the form of celtic field
agriculture,2 implying a higher degree of collective organization.
The driving force behind these changes is thought to be the development of more
hierarchical forms of social organization and increased competition between groups.
Roymans and Kortlang (1999) argue that population increase and corresponding
pressure on the land created social problems that were (at least partly) dealt with by
changes in the mortuary ritual. Each local community probably consisted of three to
six families, controlling a territory comprising a celtic field complex with dispersed
farmsteads, an urnfield, and a peripheral zone of uncultivated land used for grazing,
collecting wood, etc. Each known urnfield is therefore an indication of such a
territory, and the farmsteads would move around in the territory with an average life
span of 20–30 years. This system contrasts with the preceding Middle Bronze Age,
where a greater degree of mobility of settlement is assumed, and the primary level of
organization is the family unit rather than the local communities of the Late Bronze
Age and Early Iron Age (Gerritsen 2003; Roymans et al. 2009).
On the basis of the number of known burial sites, a steadily rising population is
assumed during the whole period (see also Gerritsen 2003; this assumption is
2 Celtic fields are small (20–40 m in width) rectangular or square plots of land that are separated by low,
man-made earthen ridges. They are found all over Northwestern Europe and date from the Late Bronze
Age until the Early Middle Ages. Spek et al. (2003) distinguish two distinct phases in the development of
these field systems (at least in the northern Netherlands). In the first phase, land was cleared and leveled
and an agricultural system with a low level of manuring and relatively long fallow periods was
established. In the Late Iron Age and Roman Period, the field boundaries were raised and widened to form
broad (8–12 m in width) earthen ridges that were intensively cultivated.
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however challenged by Fokkens 2002, pp. 143–144). Compared to the Middle
Bronze Age, a threefold increase in population is postulated at the beginning of the
Early Iron Age. A process of “filling up” of the landscape is assumed by fission of
small groups of people from existing settlements. Survey evidence suggests that this
filling up was not only done by occupying empty areas but also at the expense of
existing territories, thereby decreasing territory sizes and distances between
settlements. Similar processes are described by Bintliff (1999) for a number of
cases in other regions and time periods. Roymans and Kortlang suggest that control
over land therefore became a crucial factor for the longer-term survival of local
communities, who developed new social mechanisms to deal with this changing
relationship with the land. By means of kinship ideology (marriage rules, patterns of
inheritance), the transmission of rights on land could be restricted to the local group.
The role of the urnfields in this process is considered crucial: they provided a long-
term focus for the community and strengthened collective identity. Furthermore, they
may have functioned as territorial markers, explicitly stating the claims of the local
community on its territory.
All in all, a coherent interpretation of Late Bronze Age/Early Iron Age settlement
in the southern Netherlands is presented. But is it a suitable theory for predictive
modeling purposes? Earlier we stated that a form of middle range theory is needed
for developing good theory-based predictive models. But do we actually have a good
example of middle range theory here in the sense of Binford (1981)?
& First of all, the theory is unambiguous. For the development of the territorial
system associated with the urnfields, a single and coherent theoretical perspective
is offered. Of course, this does not mean that alternative theories might not be
available.
& The theory clearly provides plausible causes (population increase and associated
social change) for demonstrable effects (the introduction of celtic field agriculture
and a change in mortuary practice coupled to territorial division of the land). The
actual interplay of causes and effects however remains somewhat vague.
& The uniformitarian condition will be problematic for any attempt to explain
social change in prehistory as there are no present-day correlates available that
could be used as benchmarks. This particular theory is no exception.
& Lastly, the model is probably not completely independent of general theories on
human behavior. Binford is not very clear on how to separate general from
middle range theory but emphasizes that middle range theory should focus on
processes (the core of processual archaeological thinking, after all) and the
variables playing a role in these. An explanatory model invoking kinship
ideology as a means to exert land control is then too general as it does not
specify the elementary processes resulting from this ideology that influence the
settlement pattern.
So, the Binfordian demands on good middle range theory are only partly fulfilled.
As the uniformitarian condition will be problematic for all theories that try to explain
social change, we can conclude that this particular requirement does not invalidate it
as middle range theory. Binford seems to have been unnecessarily restrictive in this
respect, possibly because he envisaged middle range theory to be used primarily for
explaining site formation processes. However, it can still pose problems in practice,
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especially since Raab and Goodyear’s definition explicitly restricts the development
of middle range theory to issues that are open to empirical exploration.
Furthermore, various authors have pointed out that it is very difficult and perhaps
impossible to devise middle range theory independently of general theory (see, e.g.,
Hodder 1991). Bogaard (2004) interprets this condition in the sense that general
theory should be developed from various mutually independent, middle range
theoretical approaches. In her case study, she used plant ecological theory relating to
the behavior of weeds to draw conclusions on Neolithic farming practices in Central
Europe. Plant ecological theory is completely independent from the (more usually
applied) anthropological theories on crop husbandry regimes and led her to reject the
(general) theory of shifting cultivation in favor of intensive garden cultivation. The
relation between middle range and general theory is therefore bottom-up and not top-
down: plant ecological theory can have implications for more general theories of
human behavior, but these theories will not influence plant ecological theory itself.
In this way, a framework of layers of theory can be developed, starting from the
most elemental building blocks to the ever more complex general theories. The
higher layers of general theories will never be independent of the lower levels of
theories used to build them, but it should not be the other way around. However, it
remains a matter of debate if this form of independence is always attainable and even
desirable as justification for any theory will have to come from evidence, but theory
should also be used to justify evidence (Kosso 2006).
Most importantly, however, we find a problem in the application of Roymans and
Kortlang’s theory to predictive modeling in its inadequate specification of how
causes and effects might have operated. It does not explain why or even if population
pressure should lead to the social change from a society based on relatively mobile
family units to one with more stable local communities. Not all of this is relevant to
predictive modeling: the assumption that urnfields may have provided a strength-
ening of collective memory does not have many consequences for a predictive
model, apart from re-affirming the undeniable fact that the urnfields were used for
much longer periods than Middle Bronze Age burial sites. However, when
considering the origins of celtic field agriculture, we have to be more wary as it is
far from clear how the celtic fields were actually used.
In general, a causal link is assumed between population pressure and changes in
agricultural production regime. Boserup (1965) considered agricultural intensifica-
tion (i.e., a reduction of the fallow period, allowing for more harvests from the same
land) to be the way prehistoric farmers coped with population pressure. This
intensification is primarily made possible through the introduction of technological
improvements like the plow, animal traction, and manuring. Population pressure in
itself, however, is not sufficient to always explain intensification (see amongst others
Carlstein 1982; Ellen 1982; Barker 1985; de Hingh 2000; Thurston 2007), and the
danger of circular reasoning is obvious as it will be hard to prove whether the
adoption of new farming techniques preceded or followed population growth.
Furthermore, extensification (taking more land into production while maintaining the
same farming methods) might be an equally well-suited strategy to cope with an
increasing demand for food. Examples of intensification of agriculture without
apparent population pressure are known as well, like the installation of a system of
surplus production for elites or producing for a market-based economy (Thurston
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2007). The issue is obviously highly relevant to predictive modeling: in a model
with extensive agriculture, evidence of farming could be found in a relatively large
zone around the settlement, and settlement territories would need to be relatively
large in comparison to population size. An intensive agricultural system implies a
much smaller zone of farming activities and, ultimately, a potentially higher density
of settlement.
From Roymans and Kortlang’s writings, it is not immediately clear whether they
see celtic field agriculture as a more intensive system than the itinerant farming
practices of the Middle Bronze Age. Roymans and Theuws (1999) specifically
mention celtic field agriculture as a form of intensification; this is however a relative
qualification. Compared to the Neolithic period, celtic field agriculture is certainly
more intensive, but compared to the Late Iron Age and Roman period it is extensive
(Spek et al. 2003; Gerritsen 2003). De Hingh (2000, pp. 210–211) concludes on the
basis of palaeobotanical research that relatively intensive agriculture with manuring
was already practiced in the Middle Bronze Age. This would seem to indicate that
the celtic fields themselves are not evidence of further intensification, especially
since no technological innovations are suggested that might have allowed for higher
agricultural production. Instead, a diversification in crops is observed in the Late
Bronze Age. Population pressure may have played a role in this as diversification
can be a means to reduce the risk of crop failure. The celtic field system itself
however primarily seems to reflect a change in land ownership and land
management, perhaps related to the broader range of crops grown and the more
intensive care these needed. Possibly, fences were erected or hedges planted to keep
cattle in the fields in fallow years.
So, how should we translate all these into a predictive model? The central issue is
how these developments influenced the spatial patterning of urnfields, farmsteads,
and celtic fields as these are the primary locations where archaeological remains may
be found.
It seems logical to assume that the first settlements were installed before the
urnfields, so if we can get a grip on settlement location factors then we will have a
good idea of potential urnfield locations as well. The primary factor influencing
settlement location choice will then have been the availability of sufficient arable
land to feed a local community of three to six families (20–40 people; Roymans and
Gerritsen 2002). Settlement location preferences will in that sense not have been
very different from the earlier Middle Bronze Age period. Given the debate on the
origins of agricultural intensification, we might either assume that these larger
communities needed a larger territory per settlement than their predecessors (in
which case small, isolated pockets of suitable land will no longer have been
preferred) or that they took the option of intensification in order to feed more people
from a similarly sized territory. Fokkens (1998) suggested that a territory of ca.
300 ha per urnfield would be sufficient to feed the population, including grazing
land. Once such a location was found and land was taken into agricultural
production, the settlement’s territory will have become more or less fixed, with an
urnfield probably installed soon afterwards in the center or at the edge of the celtic
field system. What happens next is crucial to the model: either we assume that the
process of fission and filling up of the landscape with settlements went at the
expense of an existing territory, in which case agriculture could only have kept up
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with food demands by means of (further) intensification, or we assume that the
groups that split off from existing settlements went to non-farmed areas, and
intensification was not necessary.
All in all, it seems that even with conservative estimates of the area necessary for
agriculture and husbandry there is little reason to expect problems with population
pressure in the early stages of the urnfield period, and a model in which groups
would split off from existing settlements to colonize a new territory seems to be the
most appropriate (see also Gerritsen 2003). In the later stages, when most of the
available arable land was taken into production, intensification may have become
more important, especially since it assumed that the poorer soils in the area became
depleted (Roymans and Gerritsen 2002). And, in fact, both processes may have
operated simultaneously in different parts of the region. We might therefore try to
apply both models to this specific situation and test these. This brings us back to the
core of the processual/post-processual debate. An important reason for early post-
processualists to reject Binford’s concept of middle range theory (Hodder 1991) is
the fact that the processes involved in archaeological site formation are inherently
inaccessible. The uniformitarian assumption can therefore never be fulfilled, and the
theory’s assumptions can never be tested empirically. We may be restating the
obvious here but we want to bring the point home once more: predictive modeling
allows us to specify probable outcomes of theoretical notions, even if the processes
themselves are inaccessible, and these outcomes can perfectly be tested using
independent observations (see also Kosso 1991).
Cognitive Predictive Modeling
In the preceding section, we have not yet tried to answer the question of how to
implement archaeological theory in predictive modeling. We contend that most, if not
all, issues pertaining to the geographical distribution of archaeological remains can be
approached by applying a combination of the principles of cognitive archaeology and
the analysis of post-depositional processes. In this study, we will not go into the latter
issue but instead concentrate on the cognitive aspects of human spatial decision-making.
We have to keep in mind that, in predictive modeling, we are trying to model a rather
specific, testable implication of archaeological theory, i.e., the influence of human
“behavior” (activities, practices) on the accumulation of the material record at the
regional scale. For this, we need a modeling structure that can translate the relevant
aspects of human behavior into spatio-temporal terms. The basics of such a method are
explained by Whitley (2004, 2005) and will be shortly recapitulated here.
The nature of human decision-making has been a topic in many areas of research
including psychology (e.g., Shanks et al. 1996), computer science (e.g., Oliver and
Smith 1990), and philosophy (e.g., Hume 1739; Hitchcock 1996). Research into the
cognitive basis of spatial patterning, including the specific interest in location
modeling or cognitive mapping, has long been the domain of human geography
(e.g., Downs and Stea 1977; Tobler 1993), economics (e.g., Weber 1929), sociology
(e.g., Christaller 1935), and even linguistics (e.g., Levinson 1992). The precise
nature of explanation, causality, and probability has been addressed by numerous
researchers in the philosophy of science (e.g., Popper 1959; Nagel 1961; Hempel
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1965; Salmon 1998), mathematics (e.g., Pearl 2000), statistics (e.g., Cox 1992), and
computer science (e.g., Besnard and Hanks 1995) to name just a few. With respect to
the principal influences upon the theoretical perspective taken in this section and the
development of the model provided here as an example, the human geography
literature (e.g., Cohen 1985; Downs and Stea 1973, 1977; Gärling and Evans 1991;
Ittleson 1973; Kitchin and Freundschuh 2000; Kitchin and Blades 2002; Moore
1979; Saarinen et al. 1984) is extremely important. The inclusion of structures and
frameworks from probability theory, cognitive archaeology, and causality (e.g., Pearl
2000; Renfrew and Zubrow 1994; Salmon 1971, 1998) are integral to this example
as well. Likewise, the enormous influence of recent advances in agent-based
modeling for social and socionatural systems, particularly the three edited volumes
by Kohler and van der Leeuw (2007), Miller and Page (2007), and Epstein (2006),
cannot be understated. This is, of course, supplemented by the vast predictive modeling
literature already cited in this article, as well as biological and economic modeling
studies—specifically the archaeological applications of optimal foraging theory
(MacArthur and Pianka 1966; Emlen 1966; Bettinger 1980; Stephens and Krebs
1986; Simms 1987; Kelly 1995; Winterhalder and Kennett 2006), the diet–breadth
model (Hames and Vickers 1982; O’Connell and Hawkes 1984; Winterhalder 1987;
Smith 1991; Grayson and Delpech 1998), central place foraging (Orians and Pearson
1979; Stephens and Krebs 1986; Jones and Madsen 1989; Metcalfe and Barlow 1992;
Bettinger et al. 1997; Bird 1997; Grayson and Cannon 1999; Zeanah 1996; Thomas
2008), and—more distantly—prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky
and Kahneman 1992; and Wakker et al. 2003). The discussion which follows can be
seen as being based on an amalgamation of the views, structures, debates, issues, and
processes originally presented by these sources.
All predictive models have one thing in common: they are expressions of a
probabilistic relationship between human behavior and prior existing spatial
conditions. Correlative (inductive) models assume that the current distribution of
archaeological sites is a direct reflection of once observable spatial characteristics
that were consciously and/or subconsciously selected as locations for human
behavior. Statistically assessing the relationships between known sites and such
characteristics leads to a predictive formula. The key elements of that formula are the
currently measurable variables which represent the initial conditions of the past and
the actual products of behavior.
Such a predictive formula, though, lacks two key elements: causality and
cognition. Obviously, correlative modelers are not assuming that there is no human
agency or decision-making in site selection. Yet, the nature of the reductionist
statistical analysis used in such models precludes any attempt to understand what
cognitive steps are actually present in the process. In between the assessment of the
initial conditions and the selection of the location for a (typically unspecified)
behavior is an assumption that some cognitive process took place which led to the
behavior which caused the deposition of the site. Absence of a site in a correlative
model implies the absence of behavior or the presence of behavior of no importance
to archaeologists. This makes the assumption that we are concerned only with the
physical products of the archaeological record itself.
By empirically showing the correlations between sites (or non-site localities) and
the modern proxies for past initial conditions, there is presumed to be no need for
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understanding the in-between step of cognition at all. Thus, correlative models place
this process in what is essentially a “black box.” Cognition is implied but is of no
direct consequence for identifying correlations. In addition, no attempt is made to
understand the relationship between behavior and the deposition of artifacts or
features; it is assumed that there is a direct and consistent correlation. The mechanics
of this “black box” are, in essence, the realm of middle range theory.
These mechanisms can be expressed as units which are causally related to each
other (Fig. 4). Each of its components can be classified as belonging to one of three
different categories:
& Conditions—those characteristics which can be (or were at one time) observed in
the landscape (or more properly the land unit under evaluation)
& Events—a behavior or action bounded in space–time which is typically not
directly observable today but which may have had physical consequences
(conditions) that are at least partially observable
& Decisions—cognitive choices which took place at one time in the past (or are
made today) which bridge the gap between observations of conditions and the
activity of events.
Decision-making is dependent on the acquisition of information. This can be
either direct (as in something perceived with the immediate senses: vision, hearing,
Fig. 4 An outline of the cognitive predictive modeling approach. Decision-making is thought to be the
result of conscious or unconscious weighing of the perceived costs and benefits of a particular action,
given certain initial conditions. Decisions taken may result in a form of behavior that leaves a material
imprint. After Whitley (2005)
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taste, touch, and smell) or indirect (information gained from other sources: second-
hand description, previous experience, or pure speculation). All the direct and
indirect acquisition and processing of information represent the cognitive process of
perception (or acquiring knowledge).
After perception, each initial condition is classified (either consciously or
subconsciously) with regard to its beneficial or adverse effects on site selection,
i.e., a cost–benefits analysis. Even though something may have no direct cost or
benefit on the behavior, it may affect how other direct or indirect variables are
perceived and classified. Once conditions are classified, a decision is made regarding
whether to carry out some behavior. That determination is not based on one cause-
and-effect relationship with a single variable. It is, in effect, a decision which is
triggered only when sufficient information has been processed through evaluating a
number of influential variables, presumably all of those which have a direct or
indirect cost or benefit for the behavior. In actuality, it is likely that many behavioral
decisions were made on the basis of partial or incomplete information.
This process does not imply that people are always fully aware of the rationale or
reasoning behind spatial behaviors. Many behaviors were probably encoded into the
neural pathways of past people in such a way that the cognitive processes of site
selection were carried out as a matter of subconscious immediacy, based on having
learned to heuristically assess a spatial environment for key indicators rather than to
fully evaluate their surroundings every time. Clearly, this becomes easier and more
predictable for commonly recurring behaviors, and full evaluation of all the possible
costs and benefits probably only occurs for uncommon or unfamiliar behaviors.
Whether the evaluation is conscious or subconscious though, the structure of the
process is still the same.
In the final probability assessment, it is this very decision which is being
modeled. A probability formula should, then, be as explanatory and as expansive as
possible and not a reductionist lowest common denominator of suitability for all
behaviors or events. Certain kinds of behavioral event are more likely to produce the
intentional discard of artifacts, the unintentional loss of them, and/or the intentional
or unintentional creation of features. But artifacts and features are not uniformly
representative of past behaviors. In fact, some highly significant spatial behaviors
result in the deposition of no artifacts or features whatsoever. Likewise, the
preservation of certain kinds of material strongly affects how we see archaeological
sites as representative of behaviors. One of the key elements of cognitive predictive
modeling is the recognition that interesting and important cognitive processes may
result in the use of land units, or vast landscapes, without any archaeological
component being deposited. This must also be distinguished from the avoidance of
areas for entirely different reasons.
This brings us to the second layer of cognition within the site selection
framework: the series of cognitive processes carried out by archaeologists. Past
cognition does not result in “sites” per se, rather in spatially dispersed material
results which unevenly represent many incidences and several broad categories of
past human behavior. Our modern cognitive process of perceiving these material by-
products (through survey and excavation) and classifying them into meaningful
clusters (i.e., sites) completes the causal chain from the initial conditions to our
typical units of study.
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Example: the Georgia Coast Model
Ultimately, though, how do we turn the cognitive modeling approach into a practical
causal explanatory predictive model? When moving from model structure to actual
application, we have to take care how to quantify the cost–benefit evaluations. Most
desirable would be to translate the costs and benefits into similar “spatial
currencies,” so to speak. This can be done relatively easily in cases dealing with
subsistence activities, where it is basically a matter of specifying “energy budgets.”
The amount of caloric energy that can be provided by a particular spatial unit (in the
form of wild animals, cereals, or any other foodstuff) can then be compared to the
amount of energy needed to actually collect the calories (including the energy
required to maintain the resource, to develop tools and techniques to collect it, to
travel to the site of its collection, to harvest it, to process it, consume it, store it for
future consumption, and to dispose of it). Several studies in the 1970s and 1980s
linked caloric travel costs to site catchment analysis (e.g., Ericson and Goldstein
1980; Styles 1981; Gregg 1988) and are still very useful for spatial modeling of
(potential) subsistence activities (e.g., van Hove 2003; Goodchild 2006). The
approach can be used for general predictive purposes by modeling the overall
difficulty of terrain access and mapping the zones where travel will be least
prohibitive and therefore the overall benefit of settling with regard to a specific
subsistence activity is highest. Although clearly limited in their ability to quantify
non-travel cost issues, these models were some of the first to link cognition and
calories in a spatial context. The following discussion provides an example of a more
complex cognitive model (Whitley et al. 2009) designed largely for explanatory
purposes but which has an inherent predictive capacity that illustrates many of the
theoretical ideas outlined above.
The Lower Coastal Plain of Georgia (Fig. 5) is a flat, wet, and heavily forested
area. Along the coast, we find estuaries protected by barrier islands. Behind these
islands lie vast expanses of salt marsh with shallow muddy tidal flats and emergent
grasses. At the seaside of the barrier islands, long stretches of narrow sandy
beaches backed by dunes are found. The ends of the islands give way to the fast-
moving and variable tides at the mouths of wide slow rivers which traveled several
hundred kilometers from the Piedmont to the Atlantic. The soil types in the area
are all very similar. They are generally only moderately suited for agriculture,
poorly drained in low elevations, and excessively or well drained in the slightly
higher ones. Today, modern logging has changed most of the upland climax
growth forest to a denser scrub understory with mixed evergreen and deciduous
forest, but the marshlands remain much as they were at the time of the first
European contact.
There are currently nearly 6,000 archaeological sites recorded within the
terrestrial portion of this area, representing more than 10,000 years of occupation.
The environment however is not very conducive to building a correlative
archaeological predictive model using the standard available set of “environmental”
variables. The general absence of steep slopes and the ubiquitous presence of
freshwater make it impossible to use those variables as a means to limit the expected
distribution of settlement choice. Soil type also does not limit site selection because
the archaeological sites from all periods are known from virtually all soils.
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The study area covers 4,669,484 acres (both land and water), and the overall
paleoeconomic model exists as three distinct elements: (1) the Habitat Model
(HM)—an interpretation of the intensity of the correlation between a given
forage category and any map unit for each month of the year, based on the
strength and distribution of key elements (i.e., attractors) in their habitat; (2) the
Available Caloric Model (ACM)—an interpretation of the total amount of calories
that could be expected in any map unit, given a habitat model value and population
density estimates for each forage category for each month of the year; and (3) the
Returned Caloric Model (RCM)—an interpretation of the amount of calories for
each forage category, each month, that could be extracted from any map unit, given
the available calories, the technological limitations, and the costs of acquiring,
processing, and transporting the targets.
The habitat model is defined by 37 forage categories (derived mostly from
Thomas 2008, but expanded); some of which are individual species (such as “white-
Fig. 5 Location of the Georgia Coast study area
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tailed deer”) while others are combinations of numerous species based on family or
genus groupings (such as “freshwater turtles”) or size/habitat limitations (such as
“large saltwater fish”). These groupings include both wild faunal and floral
resources, as well as domesticated (or semi-domesticated) species. Ultimately,
weighted additive formulas were developed for each forage category using 15
baseline environmental attractors (derived from the USFWS National Wetlands
Inventory maps, the NRCS Soils Survey Geographic Database, the USGS National
Elevation Dataset, the NOAA Hydrographic Survey Dataset, the GDNR Land Use/
Land Cover data, and the USEPA Level 4 Ecoregions Data). The strength of the
attractors (i.e., formula weights) were based on both qualitative and quantitative
assessments of preference derived from sources such as Thomas (2008), Smith
(1992), Reitz et al. (2010), NARSAL (2010), Georgia DNR (2010), and nearby
states’ online resources giving population estimates or biological statistics. They
were broken out by month of the year as well. The results are a series of 444
individual GIS surfaces (37 forage categories * 12 months), each of which covers all
4,669,484 acres with a resolution of 30 m (900 sq m). Each of the 20,996,530
datapoints (referred to here as a “map unit”) has a decimal value ranging between 0
and 1, which represents the predicted habitat suitability for each forage category for
each month for that 900-sq-m location.
To transform the habitat model into a caloric expression (the Available Caloric
Model), a series of variables were generated, including the population density of
each forage category (per 30 m map unit), their average size, the ranges in weight by
gender, the adult/juveniles and gender ratios, the usable calories per kg, the average
number of offspring, the mean birth months, time until sexual maturation, prime
harvest months, crop yield, and fallow cycle. All of these assessments were based on
the same sources of information as above or were projected as reasonable
quantitative estimates where no specific data, or only qualitative data, were
available. It should be noted that the framework of this GIS model is not dependent
upon the initial values chosen and inserting better or alternate data is always possible
when it becomes available.
The analysis of these variables allows a projection of the expected number of
calories per 30 m map unit of prime habitat (i.e., HM value of 1), as well as their
monthly resilience (a function of the estimated population density, their rate of
survival assuming a stable population, the length of time it takes for an individual to
reach reproductive maturity, and their mean number of offspring). The maximum
available calories were calculated by forage category and month, assuming climatic
conditions similar to today and a stable (modern) sea level since 4500 BP. The
caloric values were then multiplied by each of the appropriate HM surfaces. The
result is the transformation of each of the 444 surfaces into an expression of the
ACM. The ACM is, in essence, a representation of the exploitable ecological
landscape by species and month.
The Returned Caloric Model (RCM) is built upon estimates of the bracketed
minimum and maximum expenditure of calories per day, per individual, in
maintaining, collecting, and processing each of the forage categories. Thomas
(2008) provides some of the estimates of collection and processing time for many of
the species involved, while others are derived from Smith (1992) or other sources.
The model assumes that maintenance (e.g., tool manufacture, making nets and weirs,
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habitat improvements, etc.) and collection costs (e.g., search times, setting and
checking traps, etc.) decrease over time (between 4500 and 300 BP—the applicable
time frame), while hunting success and harvest rates, as well as storage potentials,
increase with certain specific technological changes (e.g., transition from spear to
dart to bow and arrow, development of pottery for storage, increased trade for high-
quality lithic materials, etc.). The return rates of calories expended for calories
collected are thus calculated as a percentage and applied to the ACM.
The RCM is intended to be used interpretively for locales where we already have
a reasonable understanding of settlements and potential populations. With that
knowledge in hand, we can generate travel costs based on cost-distance evaluations
using both foot and canoe caloric friction and use it to calculate potential caloric
surpluses or deficits for a given site, at a given point in time, with regard to a given
season or month and based on projected populations and dietary preferences. For
areas where we do not have extensive prior knowledge of site locations, we would
generate a summary probability surface based on a composite model. One example
of such a model (dietary preference) was devised for the period between 4500 BP
and 300 AD using all 37 forage categories. It is pinned at either end by proportional
estimates based on Late Archaic and Contact Period faunal and floral assemblages.
The values in between are calculated as exponential or logarithmic percentages of
the difference between the end values. The dietary model is not intended to
definitively represent an archaeological interpretation of the range in past diet; rather,
it is meant to provide a simulation which can be used to express an overall
impression of the transition from Late Archaic to Contact Period diet as we currently
understand it. That allows us to use those proportional estimates to weight the
returned calories by forage category and month and combine them into a composite
probability formula for any point in time. This has not yet been applied to the entire
study area; however, another example was previously provided by looking at one
detailed aspect of the study area.
An area near the boundary between Georgia and Florida measuring approximately
36 by 28 km was presented as a sample area (see Fig. 5) within which to produce
and test a cognitive predictive model (Whitley et al. 2009). A simple deductive
predictive model was made using a composite of all available calories by season
(such as shown in Fig. 6) and the highest caloric return areas were compared to the
known locations of existing sites. In this case, 308 sites fall within the study area.
Merely splitting the composite caloric returns surface equally into three categories
(low, moderate, and high) produced a Kvamme’s gain statistic3 (Kvamme 1988) in
excess of 0.80, whereas the best correlative or intuitive models did not produce
better gains than 0.57 (Fig. 7). Furthermore, almost all of the sites in low-potential
areas were found along the edge of high or moderate probability areas. Their
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3 Gain is calculated as follows:
G ¼ 1 pa
ps
where
pa The area proportion of the zone of interest (usually the zone of high probability)
ps The proportion of sites found in the zone of interest.
Fig. 7 Predictive map based on the caloric returns model
Fig. 6 Expected caloric returns for turkey
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location can likely be attributed to lack of resolution in the data or lack of accuracy
in recording rather than to a preference for low probability areas for some other
reason. This was a clear example of the power of caloric surfaces to project potential
site locations even with a minimum of interpretation injected.
But developing a cognitive predictive model also means that we try to understand
things such as what kinds of activity occurred in which areas, what the nature of
resource competition was like, how foraging differed between genders, and how the
perceptions of the agents affected their knowledge of resources and their costs for
acquisition. This is the middle range theory portion of the analysis. For example,
given that some species return only a modest number of calories, while others much
more so, the cost-distance (i.e., foraging radius) at which it is no longer efficient to
collect them would vary depending on their probable caloric return, ability to be
gathered in quantity, dietary attractiveness, potential for other uses, and the current
caloric or nutritional stress of the foragers. Similarly, the cost-distance radius at
which it is more efficient to process the collected resource rather than bring it back
whole (i.e., processing radius) would also be a function of its weight and its
processing time or difficulty. Thomas (2008) provides a very detailed discussion of
the probable foraging and processing radii for many species or forage categories in
the Coastal Georgia region. In general, he finds that for most species an effective
one-way-daily foraging radius of 450 kcal consumed (or around 5 km in his
estimation) is likely (Thomas 2008, Fig. 11.12). He also charts processing radii as a
function of distance and categorical thresholds (Thomas 2008, Table 10.7).
For the Coastal Georgia analysis, caloric distances were calculated from known
archaeological locations in the study area (based on 2010 information from the
Georgia State Site Files) for both foot and canoe travel. The resulting surfaces can be
used in several different ways. First, foraging and processing thresholds can be
generated for any species of interest. For example, the processing radii provided by
Thomas (2008, Table 10.7) can actually be mapped as buffers around a central place,
indicating the point beyond which it is more efficient to process the resource before
bringing it back. This helps illuminate areas where we would expect to find
processing sites related to central place occupations. This is particularly pertinent
with regard to shellfish processing vs. consumption and is an example of predictive
modeling in a local context.
Assuming an average effective daily foraging radius of 450 kcal, the “catchment
areas” around any given location can be mapped (based on foot and canoe travel—
i.e., terrestrial and marine foraging, respectively—Figs. 8 and 9 illustrate both for a
portion of the study area) and the mean and total caloric returns can be calculated for
any given month for any one species or for weighted combinations that represent
projections of complete diets. Since this can be done with high-scoring probability
areas as well as known sites, it could be used to estimate carrying capacities and
populations even in unsurveyed areas.
Because these models are ultimately representations of the spatial distribution of
potential energy sources, it may be possible to develop a wide range of interpretive
surfaces that consider more complex economic issues (a few examples are illustrated
in Fig. 10). The foraging radii (including both proximity- and perception-related fall-
off rates) can provide estimates of carrying capacity, relative monthly bounties by
forage categories, intensity of resource competition, and surplus and exchange
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Fig. 8 Single day’s foraging limits for hunting, Late Mississipian/Contact Period
Fig. 9 Single day’s foraging limits for fishing, Late Mississipian/Contact Period
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potential. Transforming the accumulated caloric distances into pseudo-topographic
surfaces can help model and understand the success of resource acquisition pathways
(e.g., by performing pseudo-hydrologic or least cost path analyses). Caloric distance can
also function as a proxy representation of territories (using caloric thresholds—“calorie-
sheds”—as boundaries) or social dominance (larger population centers may occupy a
visible “caloric sink” and they might extract calories from adjacent areas through
controlling exchange routes or tribute).
With regard to the potential for predictive models, the modeled pathways from
very-high-scoring areas would be particularly interesting. These would be the
corridors along which resource gatherers would routinely spend a great deal of their
time. We would expect that sites resulting from the loss or discard of artifacts
associated with daily activities would occur along these pathways, and a predictive
model could be generated to capture them.
This example is still a work in progress. The specific surfaces illustrating the
available caloric returns and the associated spatial decisions are guided by the
environmental conditions, the species present, the acquisition (e.g., hunting, gathering,
agriculture) and storage technologies available, and furthermore in the nature of trade,
tribute, and the speculation on future returns that may have been part of social
contracts. But ultimately these ideas fall within the “black box” of cognition and are in
the realm of middle range theory. With respect to Binford’s criteria:
1. Cognitive modeling in this example is unambiguous. The theory presented is
straightforward and based on solid principles of energy capture and conserva-
Fig. 10 Illustration of other potential interpretative surfaces resulting from the modeling
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tion, without being (environmentally) deterministic. Although prediction is
implied rather than specifically addressed at this juncture, the basis for making
location predictions includes modeling agent-based decisions and perspectives,
as well as gender and social differences.
2. The process of decision-making presented is distinctly cause and effect, not
correlative. Though correlative measures can be used to test the validity of
identified associations, those associations are not presumed upon the existence
of the correlations.
3. Binford’s notion of uniformitarian assumptions is satisfied if we consider his
meaning to have been that the explanations presented in this model do not
require the adoption of general rules of human behavior that do not apply in
other areas under other conditions. The only general rule or assumption required
by the Georgia Coast Model is that of energy conservation as a primary
motivating factor for certain human spatial behaviors.
4. The model can be considered independent from general theory (in the sense of
Bogaard 2004) because it is independent from our assumptions about Native
American subsistence practices on the Georgia Coast and their knowledge of the
landscape. The theoretical framework itself does not change if we were suddenly
to discover that the Georgia Coast natives hunted a different range of animals,
grew different crops, or used a different means of transport. Therefore, it can be
transplanted to different regions and time periods as well. Only the variables
need change, not the theory.
However, in its current form, the model cannot be used directly for aspects of
human behavior that are not related to (daily) subsistence activities. The model
assumes that spatial units can represent a quantified “value” to the users of the
available resources—in other words, a “spatial currency” to be withdrawn, banked,
or traded to others. The decisions made reflecting their use or storage are tempered
by the costs and benefits involved. However, not everything can be so easily
budgeted and evaluated for costs and benefits in terms of caloric returns. In many
cases, calories are expended in exchange for ephemeral or often unmeasureable
benefits. Energy might, for example, be “converted” into valuable resources in the
case of extraction of lithics, metals, or other natural resources, which can in turn be
used for other purposes or traded for other goods. It will however, in many cases, be
difficult to specify what the currency at the other end of the equation is, let alone the
conversion rate.
Take for instance burials. While we can probably specify the energy input needed
to go to a particular place and perform the burials and associated rituals, there is no
quantifiable output involved. Possible benefits could be of a practical (deposing of
the deceased’s body), social (strengthening community bonds), and ritual nature
(providing a place of access to the world of the ancestors), and all of these have no
clear quantifiable or even spatial characteristics, leaving us with considerable
problems when trying to predict the most probable location for a burial site. A
number of other examples could be given in which the perception of costs and
benefits, rather than the exact measures of these, will determine the outcome of the
evaluation. Evaluating and using a cognitive cost–benefit approach will therefore
almost never be a clear-cut case—which is where the multiple modeling framework
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comes in. By specifying more than one option and looking at the issue from multiple
perspectives, we might be able to come up not so much with the final answer but at
least with the most probable one (or a few probable ones).
Many of the earlier attempts to set up and test multiple models were basically
constrained by the technical difficulties involved. Even in the late 1990s, setting up
and calculating a suite of scenarios in a GIS could take weeks or months, which
would make it highly impractical to pursue a multitude of models. While we still do
not have software that is particularly geared towards these kinds of exercises,
increased computing power has now made it possible to run hundreds or thousands
of models in a relatively short time. The modeling itself is no longer the problem—
but developing and translating the necessary theory still is.
Some might argue that the modeling procedure suggested does not provide much
innovation. And in fact our approach should be seen more as a logical extension of
agency theory to older concepts like site catchment analysis and optimal foraging
theory than as an inclusion of the “individual emotional, sensational, and
experiential aspects that are unique to that individual” (Dornan 2002, p. 322). It is
in that sense still closely connected to the systemic, processual way of thinking and
might therefore by some be considered fundamentally structuralist and therefore “de-
humanized.” However, we hope to have made clear that the approach sketched is not
at all limited to ecological or economic systems and is a long way removed from the
inductive and intuitive procedures prevalent in predictive modeling. The cognitive
modeling framework has already been successfully applied to a variety of case
studies, including American slave societies (Whitley 2003), an Egyptian necropolis
(Burns et al. 2008), and long term hunter–gatherer subsistence dynamics in the
drowning Mesolithic landscape in the Dutch province of Flevoland (Peeters 2007),
and as far as we can judge it delivers predictions more cost-effectively than
(especially) inductive models. It includes agency in a straightforward way by
specifying what Cowgill (2000) describes as “recurrent types of context” within
which people react with reasoning in regard to their perceived interests. These
contexts are specific configurations of social and environmental variables that not so
much determine the issues about which people reason but at least narrow these down
to a range of what is likely. The key problem to solve is then trying to recognize
what might have been the perceived interests of people within their socio-
environmental context.
Model Testing
Having established a framework for building theoretically informed, cognitive
predictive models, we now want to turn our attention to the other side of the
equation: how do we decide whether the model is any good or better than a
competing model? Testability (or refutability) is the hallmark of any good scientific
theory (Bell 1994), and, as we stated earlier, modeling is a way of opening up a
theory to testing. However, we have to be careful with the terminology used with
regard to model testing. Predictive models are often supposed to be “validated” by
confronting them with (measured) data. Note that, in the case of predictive models as
they are currently applied, the only testable implication is found in the prediction of
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the geographical concentration of archaeological remains, in particular settlement
sites. Repeated consistency between model output and measured response is then
taken as proof that the model is validated or even verified. However, in its true
sense, a valid model is one that is without logical errors and internally consistent
(Oreskes et al. 1994). And in order to be verified, the model should be “true,” i.e.,
produce accurate results under all circumstances. It is not hard to see that most
sciences will have tremendous difficulties in producing these kinds of model results,
and successful examples are restricted to things like the prediction of celestial
mechanics, for example. In all other cases, confirming observations do not prove the
veracity of a model; they only support its probability.
Predictive model testing is therefore a procedure with two aspects. First, we have
to establish the internal consistency of the model, and we could call this the
validation phase. Most importantly, we should be looking for possible conceptual
errors in the model (and thus in the theory behind the model; Bell (1994) refers to
this as consistency testing). In this stage, factual error should be considered as well:
have we used data sets that correctly represent the parameters that we want to
include in the model? This relates both to the “environmental” factors (like using an
accurate digital elevation model) as well as the archaeological data whose
chronological and interpretative accuracy should be assessed.
In predictive modeling, testing is either done through peer review, statistical
evaluation, or a combination of both, using new survey or excavation data when they
become available. Peer review (or expert judgment) is currently the only method
used for identifying conceptual error in the model and the underlying theory, and
more formalized methods for doing so seem to be lacking anyway. Statistical
evaluation of the model results (empirical testing) will not suffice for this as it can
only indicate that there is something wrong with the model predictions but can never
tell us directly what the cause of the problem is: conceptual error (interpretive
mistakes) and/or observational bias and/or factual error. In theory, by removing
observational bias, we might be able to ascertain that unsatisfactory predictions point
to conceptual and/or factual model errors. Spotting and “repairing” conceptual error
could be handled by applying different theoretical frameworks to the same situation
to see which framework offers the best predictions. This would seem similar to
calibrating a model, a procedure in which the interactions between the model
components are varied in order to tune model output to conform to known
observations. Calibration, however, while standard practice in statistical (regression)
modeling, ignores all problems of conceptual and factual error as well as
observational bias.
In the second stage of testing, the model should be confronted with observational
data to establish its predictive power: how good are the predictions and what is the
uncertainty involved? We could call this the evaluation phase (Oreskes 1998) where
both positive and negative results are possible, and these can be used to establish
whether the model is good enough for its purposes. The evaluation phase basically
legitimizes the use of the model, e.g., for management purposes. This somewhat
contrasts with Bell’s (1994) idea of empirical testing. In his (refutationist) view,
testing can only serve to disprove theories, but the data themselves will never do
this. It is the scientist who decides that data refute a particular theory. Obviously, a
model may be rejected after realizing that the available data contradict its outcome,
84 Verhagen and Whitley
but the actual criteria on when to refute a model are unspecified and using statistical
significance levels is only partly helpful in this. By defining probability ranges as
“acceptable” outcomes, anomalies may be explained away as unimportant: it all
depends on the willingness of the scientist to accept anomalies as being significant
deviations from the expected. Still we do not see a good alternative to using
statistical methods for this aspect of model testing.
Dealing with Observational Bias
In early predictive modeling studies, a considerable effort was made to identify the
proper statistical methods for model testing (Rose and Altschul 1988; Kvamme
1988, 1990). Not surprisingly, it was concluded that probabilistic sampling is a
necessary precondition for collecting data sets to be used for testing as this is the
only way to obtain statistically reliable predictions and thus avoid the problem of
observational bias. This is not only relevant to questions of representativity of the
archaeological data set; it is also important for obtaining representative samples of
the independent variables used for prediction. However, various authors concluded
that this condition could not be met under most circumstances (Brandt et al. 1992;
Dalla Bona 1994; Deeben et al. 1997) because of biases in archaeological survey
procedures and therefore a statistically “valid” prediction of site densities would, in
most cases, be illusory. In fact, many predictive modelers for this reason even gave
up on inductive modeling and stopped applying statistical tests to judge model
performance—which obviously does not solve the problem. Unfortunately, this also
meant that some new developments in the statistical sciences were not picked up by
predictive modelers (and archaeologists in general).
The development of resampling methods in the 1990s forms a quite radical
departure from using traditional, so-called parametric statistical methods (see Efron
and Tibshirani 1993; Simon 1997; Lunneborg 2000). Resampling was originally
developed for statistical inference from small and non-randomly collected data sets.
By using sub-samples from the actual available sample, an unlimited number of new
data sets with slightly differing characteristics can be simulated and used for
obtaining sample means and confidence intervals and for statistical hypothesis
testing. Commonly used methods include bootstrap resampling, permutation
resampling, and Monte Carlo simulations. Strange as it may seem to the non-
initiated, this method actually works very well and has consistently been shown to
produce more reliable estimates of model errors and uncertainty for small and non-
randomly collected data sets than using standard parametric methods. Apart from
that, the concepts of resampling are straightforward and are usually more easily
understood by non-statisticians than traditional statistics—which does not mean that
the calculations are always simple. For a science, like archaeology, that has to deal
with difficulties in obtaining decent-sized representative data sets in many cases, it
offers the potential of obtaining statistically more reliable measures of predictive
model quality with relatively small and non-optimal data sets (Verhagen 2007b).
Nevertheless, it remains necessary to always consider the potential problems of
survey bias for both development and testing of predictive models. Even though the
principles and validity of probabilistic sampling techniques have been recognized by
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archaeologists for a long time, everyday practice in current, heritage-management-
driven survey is encouraging preferential sampling of particular regions and site
types. This is partly due to the fact that the predictive models themselves are
predominantly used in CRM for designating zones where survey is enforced (see,
e.g., van Leusen 2009), which means that supposedly high probability areas will be
surveyed more often than low probability zones. Secondly, it is related to the fact
that certain site types are decidedly more difficult to detect than others. For
economic reasons, most surveys will therefore tend to favor the detection of
relatively large and conspicuous archaeological sites, and this practice is in many
cases even codified in national or state survey guidelines. More ephemeral
phenomena, like burial grounds, off-site features, and lithic scatters, will be under-
represented in most surveys (see Zeidler 1995; Verhagen 2005; Verhagen and
Borsboom 2009). And thirdly, because most archaeological survey work is
development-driven, surveys will be carried out predominantly in areas with a high
level of spatial development. Most of these will be located in the vicinity of
urbanized areas, whereas places such as nature reserves, agricultural production
zones, or forestry stands will tend to be under-represented not only in the
archaeological record but also in the samples of independent variables used for
prediction. So, there is a real danger in unwittingly using archaeological survey data
sets for predictive model testing, and the most important task is therefore to identify
potential biases and try to correct for them. Surprisingly enough, there is very little
work done on these issues even though the importance of “source criticism” is
acknowledged in many regional archaeological studies (see, e.g., Mischka 2008).
However, standard methods for survey data “filtering” do not exist even though the
statistical basis for it is well developed and can be relatively easily applied to
predictive modeling (see, e.g., Verhagen 2007b; Finke et al. 2008; van Leusen et al.
2009).
Issues Still to be Solved
It would be far too optimistic to think that applying the cognitive predictive
modeling methodology will immediately solve all issues relevant to predicting and
interpreting the location of archaeological remains. In the following section, we want
to discuss briefly some issues that we think need further study to be better integrated
in (cognitive) predictive modeling. These are group agency, temporality, and the
prediction of specific occurrences.
Group Agency
Many manifestations of material culture are evidence of group rather than individual
actions, but the methodology for dealing with the agency of social collectives seems
to be underdeveloped. This is also demonstrated by the majority of agent-based
modeling studies where simulated individual agents are provided with rules for
social behavior, and patterns will emerge from the interactions of individuals over
time. For predictive modeling, however, a certain amount of universality of
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individual actions is a necessary precondition, and it begs the question whether the
appropriate unit of analysis is the individual or rather a larger social group.
Agency theory in itself does not preclude dealing with groups as agents, but we
will have to decide on the scale level first before trying to include agency into our
models. As was demonstrated in the preceding section, when trying to model
potential activity zones around settlements, the individual perspective is clearly
important. The amount of effort that people can put into activities like hunting,
fishing, or extracting lithic resources is a primary determinant for territory size (see
also, e.g., Trifković 2005). However, the perceived benefit of actually going after
these resources may very well be based on collective norms and values. Even more,
some of these activities, like hunting big game, can only be performed in groups.
Similarly, the choice for a new settlement location or a burial place may be based on
group decisions rather than individual preferences. And new groups might bring new
technologies and perceptions with them. For example, it is only after Roman
colonization that we see widespread quarrying in many mountainous regions of
Europe, made possible by technological innovations in mining and road building and
triggered by a new, socio-economic demand for building in stone. Again it points to
the importance of stipulating generalized individual behaviors within a specific
socio-environmental context when trying to use agency in predictive modeling.
Temporality
Clearly, there are techniques available to produce dynamical spatial models based on
simulations like agent-based modeling; so, why bother with GIS-based, static
cognitive models if we can have the real thing, including agency and temporality?
Dynamical models (as far as they have been used by archaeologists) are generally set
up for exploratory, heuristic purposes rather than to provide accurate predictions (or
more aptly retrodictions) of the actual archaeological record. The practitioners of
dynamical modeling are usually very reluctant to draw conclusions in a predictive
sense from these models. In most cases, dynamical models will be able to give a
good idea of the kinds of pattern that will emerge from certain behaviors but not of
the exact location or the chronological order in which they will appear. This is due to
the fact that these so-called non-linear models are extremely sensitive to initial
conditions and the accumulation of small variations (Allen 1997), a fact that is
thought to be true for “real life” as well. Any dynamical model that would aim for
(reliable) prediction would therefore have to be based on “real” initial conditions and
have benchmark data available of intermediate and end conditions as well in order to
limit the outcome of the simulations to more or less realistic scenarios. It will not
come as a surprise that this may be a real problem when dealing with archaeological
data sets.
Some exceptions are found: Lake (2000), for example, set up a dynamical
foraging model for the gathering of hazelnuts on the island of Islay (Scotland) in the
Mesolithic. He had to conclude that there was a rather poor fit between the known
flint scatters and the modeled areas of hazelnut abundance, casting serious doubts on
the theoretical assumption underlying the modeling that hazelnut gathering was a
primary determinant for site location. We therefore see real potential in these
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techniques for predictive modeling, especially since the cognitive predictive
modeling approach does not need to be significantly adapted in order to be used
in a dynamical modeling context. For the moment however the technical difficulties
involved are still substantial since no off-the-shelf GIS offers dynamical modeling
capabilities, and the available open source products have not yet reached a sufficient
state of sophistication for easy application. The MAGICAL software developed by
Lake for example was developed for use with GRASS version 4 and has not been
upgraded since. The SWARM initiative (www.swarm.org), while better maintained,
is not coupled to GIS and needs serious programming skills to be used to effect.
Perhaps even more telling, on the web pages of the freeware and relatively user
friendly agent-based modeling package NetLogo (which has recently acquired the
capability to import GIS data), not a single archaeological sample model is
mentioned (http://ccl.northwestern.edu/netlogo/models). This would point to an only
lukewarm interest in these modeling techniques from the side of archaeologists
despite the optimism expressed in Bentley and Maschner (2003) and Beekman and
Baden (2005)
Predicting the Unusual
Archaeology has sometimes been accused of being obsessed with the unique
(Pollard 2004). This evidently has its roots in the old tradition of archaeology as a
scientifically justified form of treasure hunting. And even nowadays, few
archaeologists will be able to resist the temptation to focus on the more spectacular
finds in an excavation and on the most peculiar archaeological sites in a study
region. The emphasis on the individual is also evident in current interest in
phenomenology and agency even though these approaches deal less directly with the
material record. It is one of the most recurrent criticisms of predictive modeling that
the models produced will fail to predict unique occurrences—the implication being
that these are more interesting and valuable than general occurrences. Note however
that Shanks and Tilley (1987, p. 38) questioned the reverse assumption, promoted by
New Archaeologists, that the formulation of universal or covering laws is a superior
kind of scientific activity.
The question of predicting anomalies however remains a tough nut to crack. Most
famously, this problem was identified by Flannery (1976) as the possibility that
Teotihuacán might be missed in a probabilistic survey of the Valley of Mexico.
While in the case of this particular site there is not much chance that this will happen
(“you couldn’t miss it if you tried”), the prediction of anomalies through any form of
statistical extrapolation is essentially impossible if we do not transfer hypotheses about
their occurrence in other contexts to the area we are interested in. Traditional correlative
modeling is no good for this, and even deductive models do not seem to be very well
suited for it because of the highly specific characteristics of these sites. Essentially, this
also holds true for “negative” anomalies, the places where no archaeological sites are
found despite the presence of all conditions favorable to settlement.
However, we want to amend to this that occurrences that are not very common
can be predicted even on the basis of a single observation—although the error rate of
the prediction will be impossible to establish in such a case. Small numbers always pose
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problems when using statistical methods, but it should be mentioned that archaeologists
tend to overestimate the number of observations needed for statistical inference by
assuming that the ultimate goal of predictivemethods is to come up with “robust”, stable
estimates with small error ranges. While this is certainly desirable from a management
perspective, modern statistical simulation techniques like resampling allow for a realistic
estimate of predictive error on the basis of much smaller numbers than are usually
considered when applying traditional statistical methods. Ultimately, however, if one
builds a model based on an explanatory understanding of cause and effect, then the
potential to predict unidentified site locations is directly related to the confidence in the
explanation and not the size of the site population.
The power of predictive models to predict the unusual ultimately depends on the
data sets used, the spatial extent and resolution chosen, and the theoretical
framework applied. For example, Late Bronze Age weapon depositions in fluvial
contexts in the Netherlands are typical examples of highly specific sites that are
considered extremely valuable for better understanding ritual practices (Roymans
and Kortlang 1999; Fontijn 2003). The finds of weaponry (especially swords) in
rivers suggest the existence of a warrior elite that may have controlled access to
exchange networks with other groups. For some reasons, these weapons were not
deposited in graves until later in the Iron Age. They are never found outside fluvial
contexts, and given the scarcity of these remains it is assumed that these locations
may have had regional or even supra-regional significance as places where
competition between local groups could be “played out.” Deposition in rivers is
therefore often interpreted by archaeologists as a means to win prestige by
destroying valuable objects without forming a threat to the strong collective basis
of society as inferred from the burial practices. A second possible interpretation is
that these deposition sites were burial places for the elite.
An extrapolation of our current knowledge concerning these depositions would
only produce a highly generalized prediction because we cannot get to the specific
spatial characteristics of deposition practice itself. Our predictive model may then be
accurate in identifying areas (river beds and adjacent flood plains) that are similar to
those where depositions have been found in the past, but it is not very precise in
delineating potential deposition locations as we do not have very clear ideas about
what made people select specific places within flood plains for weapon deposition
nor do we have sufficient data to correlate these places to other specific elements of
the landscape. Consequently, we will then end up with predictive models with a
large amount of “false positives,” i.e., with a low gain.
The Issue of Scale
Other fundamental questions concerning the specificity of predictions are coupled to
geographical and temporal scale or resolution. Moving back and forth between
scales is a fundamental aspect of archaeological research as all of our generalizations
are made on the basis of individual observations that we try to connect into a
coherent interpretative and theoretical framework. Much of what we rubricate under
problems of scale constitute an artifact of the way in which we collect and classify
our data. This is not typical only of archaeology: all cartographic data suffer from
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this as they are the end product of generalization and classification schemes.
However, it is not always appreciated that the observational scale used may not be
the scale at which processes operate and patterns emerge. The modifiable area unit
problem for example is a well-known phenomenon in geography: patterns can be
made to emerge and disappear by changing the size and positions of the
observational units. Furthermore, geographers have long recognized the problem
of what is known as ecological fallacy, i.e., the danger of erroneous extrapolation
from one scale level to another (see, e.g., Harris 2006).
By choosing a specific scale of analysis for predictive modeling (both in terms of
resolution as well as in geographic extent), we already impose limitations on the patterns
that may emerge without knowing beforehand what these may be. These are then further
limited by our selection of predictor variables. It also means that we can never be certain
if we have chosen the “right” scale for our modeling unless we have experimented with
varying spatial extents and resolutions. This is a reality that we have to live with and
makes it difficult to specify predictive model quality requirements beforehand. In most
cases, we will have very little to choose from because of the limitations of the available
data sets. One of the reasons why working with digital elevation models and derived
variables like slope and aspect became so popular in North American predictive
modeling was the availability of cheap or even free elevation models from the US
government. Similarly, the spatial extent of predictive models is often limited to
administrative boundaries, which has the added disadvantage of introducing edge effects
when using variables based on distance calculations.
Conclusions
We hope to have shown that, by considering archaeological predictive modeling
from a theoretically informed perspective, both CRM and academic research can
benefit. The (deductive) cognitive modeling framework is extremely flexible, easier
to operate and understand, better suited for testing purposes, and as far as we can tell
produces better predictions than the currently prevailing alternatives—although we
have to be a bit wary about the last statement as controlled field tests of predictive
models are still very rare. We still see an important role however for inductive,
correlative methods as tools for exploratory data analysis in the phase leading up to
theory building—after all, theories do not fall out of thin air; they are always based
on particular observations. Inductive methods can also be useful for filling in the
gaps when theory is un(der)developed. In cases where we insufficiently understand
the reasons for a particular behavior to define cause-and-effect relationships,
statistical methods can at least give us an idea of the bandwidths involved.
Explanatory models like the Georgia Coast Model not only increase the power of
the predictions made but can also be used to explore all kinds of questions on the
spatial behavior of people in the past. Predictive modeling in this way evolves into a
heuristic tool for developing and testing archaeological theory, not just an equation
that will give us an estimate of site densities for a particular region. The “stories”
that will emerge from the modeling will then become part of the interpretative stage
of archaeological research and may even contribute to, for example, the development
of a cultural biography of a particular region for CRM purposes. However, we also
90 Verhagen and Whitley
hope to have made clear that the translation of archaeological theory into a predictive
model is not always easy and will in most cases need a thorough analysis and re-
interpretation of the available theoretical perspectives on the spatial patterning of
archaeological remains into practical, middle range theoretical models.
We also think that the methodology suggested in this paper can be helpful in breaking
through the self-reinforcing mechanism of site-based archaeological research in CRM
that leads to doing more of the same all of the time. Cognitive predictive modeling is
flexible enough to accommodate the prediction of all kinds of human activity leading to
a variety of material imprints in the archaeological record. Of course, the chain of cause
and effect can be carried further to include our evaluating of archaeological sites for their
significance to heritage management, our reactions with different kinds of preservation
ormanagement behavior, and the results of our efforts on understanding specific cultural
landscapes and the archaeological record in general. However, we still have to see
whether such an approach may lead to a change in dealing with predictive modeling in
CRM. After all, many of the users of predictive maps working in urban and rural
planning are not really interested in ever more complex and subtle mapping but need
clear guidelines on what to do with the archaeological “problem”.
This may not always be the case however. As part of their land management
responsibilities under Section 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act, the Vicksburg
District of the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) is funding the implementation of a
predictive model built on the framework of the Georgia Coast Model. This includes
developing a series of interpretive surfaces based on paleoeconomic modeling and aimed
at specific temporal periods, site types, and behaviors. Although the study will cover the
nearly 43,000,000 acres of the district, the goal is not to simplify the results into a high–
low dichotomous model but to provide a quantitative measure for the probability of
encountering the classes of sites and behaviors that the regulatory agencies (i.e., the
USACE and the Mississippi, Louisiana, and Arkansas State Historic Preservation
Offices) have helped to define. This may entail thinking about CRM predictive
modeling in a new way—as a tool for both planning future impacts to unsurveyed areas
and managing the resources once they are identified. It also entails working in a
partnership with agencies and individuals that may have different goals in mind and
finding ways in which to bridge the gap between interpretation and useful application.
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